Conversion: a how-to-guide please?

[Nikitta]

Originally Posted by Torben

Is this the consensus position of the scientific community? It sound like your personal point of view.

I have never heard of anyone cured for PTSD with drugs alone. In fact, what I've seen recommended by psychiatrists, for instance, is a combination of medicine and phychotherapy - and that's not just for PTSD. I have seen people being given only medicine and nothing else and they end up like zombies - not cure, but just pacified. It's a lot better than what we used to have, but - you still cannot eliminate the need for talking about it with someone.

Originally Posted by Torben

I don't see how that follows. And I still don't know what a 'self' would be like, even if you're right. Do you?

No - I still don't have the Nobal price. Thanks for asking

However - the treatment of the mentally ill - especially those who have had a traumatic experience has improved since we stopped trating only the brain and started giving them psychotheraphy, AFAIK.

Now - of course, you may say that the reason why we can't cure those diseases with only medicine is because we don't have enough knowledge about the brain - and of medicine - yet. However, the fact that medicine plus psychotheraphy helps as much as it does when medicine alone fails would indicate that there's more going on.

[Nikitta]

Originally Posted by Torben

This is partly true, I believe. Due to memories. If one copy experiences memories after the split, that person will be dead when killed. If not, not. This seems to me inevitable and elegant. It makes a very complicated question completely vanish. This is the kind of feeling you should get from solving a confusing question. The only mystery is in our mind, not the world as such.

So, you mean that if you created a copy of somone and shoot the original in the head, right afterwards, before any of them have opened their eyes - killing him or her instantly, then you haven't really killed anyone?

I still do not see the question as having vanished.

[Torben]

Originally Posted by Nikitta

So, you mean that if you created a copy of somone and shoot the original in the head, right afterwards, before any of them have opened their eyes - killing him or her instantly, then you haven't really killed anyone?

I still do not see the question as having vanished.

Right, "killed" was a weasel-word. Obviously you've killed a human. But since there is no break in the continuity (replace "opened their eyes" with 'experienced stuff' in your post) of personal experience, the person that was lives on. There is no difference in my mind between the above scenario with my comments and with a mind transfer.

The question vanishes because it focuses on an unambiguous feature of identity, namely memory.

[Torben]

Originally Posted by The Valiant Paladin

Impossible like "the Heisenberg uncertainty principle" impossible.

The Heisenberg principle is very much possible. But I think I know what you mean.

Why would you think this process was impossible?

[Torben]

Originally Posted by The Valiant Paladin

You know of any drug that can cure a mental illness like PTSD without any kind of psychotherapy?

I don't know much about it, but the claim as posed seemed made-up and, further, with little relevance to the actual point (non-sequitir). I shouldn't have gotten into this as it is a distraction.

Even if the claim about PTSD is correct, Nikitta's conclusion doesn't follow.

[The Valiant Paladin]

Originally Posted by Torben

The Heisenberg principle is very much possible. But I think I know what you mean.

Why would you think this process was impossible?

Because it can't be done according to the laws of physics?

[Torben]

Originally Posted by The Valiant Paladin

Because it can't be done according to the laws of physics?

I kinda got how you thought so. Would you care to elaborate?

[Torben]

Originally Posted by Nikitta

I am not saying that small changes will turn us into a completely different person. I guess I'm saying that I don't believe that there is a 1:1 relation between how the atoms in our brains are configured and who we are. They are very closely related, but I don't think it's 1:1.

Good! We're approaching each other here. The multitudinous Nikittas that you recall were all different, yet they all claimed to be Nikitta. So, no, definitely not at 1:1 relation.

You never said which of these Nikittas should we believe to be the 'real' Nikitta? You say you/they all are. A bit like saying the trinity is one person :P

Originally Posted by Nikitta

As I understand it, it has been discovered that the brain isn't neatly segmented with various parts being responsible for various tasks and it's not like you have the memory of what a horse looks like stored in one specific part of your brain and the memory of what a potatoe tastes like in another.

This is irrelevant.

Originally Posted by Nikitta

It's not so much the mind transfer as the alterings needed to fit a human mind into a mechnical gadget, which you agree can be a much bigger change than what sleep would cause. Transferring my mind into an entirely similar media, with no adaptations needed, is a different story.

I only conceded the point in the case where alterations would be made to exclude dependence on touch. How about if my smoking desires were edited out? Would it still be me?

Originally Posted by Nikitta

Because that the change required to fit a human mind into a mechanical gadget would be much bigger than what sleep can cause and that it would be more fundamental - due to our connection to our bodies, other humans and such, which I see as a very fundamental part of who we are and this especially since the transferred mind would remember its body and its previous situation, so the change would be bigger than going to sleep and waking up in the same or a very similar body. It would be like waking up in a different place, in a different kind of body, with completely different type of sensation than when you went to sleep. Some major changes would be needed to adapt to that.

Agreed, those are major changes. But they are not central to our sense of self, much like a quadruple-amputee would not claim to be a completely different person. You, again, implicitly assume natural changes as occurs during sleep as non-existent because you don't notice them.

Originally Posted by Nikitta

Actually, I don't know what kind of limit whatever makes me me imposes on us. I'm merely wondering and I suppose that not knowing it is part of why this worries me.

Maybe I'm just upset that you don't immediately accept my ideas?
Jokes aside, I do think you have very definite ideas about stuff like personal identity (it's unique and non-transferable) and human minds (they cannot run on other hardware than brains).

Originally Posted by Nikitta

I agree that our memory is very important to our identity.

I don't think you address my point. Yes, memories are important in a colloquial sense, but we're talking about the basis of personal self-identification. You don't address that. You also don't speculate as to what may be the building blocks of your 'self' (trying hard not to call it a soul :P).

Originally Posted by Nikitta

I have tried reading about what makes us who we are and gave "The Private Life of the Brain" a try, but I found it too technical for me. If you know of any good books on the subject, which would be less technical, I would appreciate you recommendations.

I like lesswrong.com, especially their sequences. It's kinda hard to pinpoint good posts there, because so much depends on preceding stuff, but start out with the core sequences and see it it's anything for you. Within the quantum mechanic sequence, there's a lot of stuff related to our topic, especially here, here, here and here.
The latter two are about a fictional 2D species splitting along the 3rd dimension at regular intervals. This may seem silly, but the author believes that the Many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct. Under this notion, we are split gazillions of times each second. Under this notion, many philosophical speculations about personal identity are wrong.

Originally Posted by Nikitta

I'm not saying that it would change who we are. I'm saying that the change is bigger than what is caused by sleep and that it might change who we are. We cannot possibly know if it will or not, yet.

Define 'bigger change'. I pointed to two different views of change; one of matter (hardware) and one of personal identities. I expect us to agree on the first, but you have provided little argument as to the second. You have yet to address the magnitude of change during sleep, dismissing it as normal.

Define 'change who we are'. I have repeatedly pointed out the gazillions of your predecessors (say, one for each second of your life) who were slightly or significantly different from you, but which you claim all possess the Nikitta self.

Or don't define it, but please start talking about it instead of assuming the terms mean what you want them to mean.

Originally Posted by Nikitta

I haven't noticed you making any guesses. In fact, I haven't even seen you recognise that there is a boundary in the first place. Could you please, explicitly explain what your guesses are?

I think there is no sharp boundary between what is 'us' and what is not.
I think minds/personal identitites are not point-like entities (i.e. a mind is not a singular thing, eternal, immutable or ontologically basic).
I think personal identities for us are collections of closely-related minds connected by memory.
I think MWI is the least wrong interpretation of QM and that we therefore split multitudes of times each second.
I think our personalities and entire conscious experiences are programs run on brain hardware.
I think for the above reasons that arbitrarily-close-to-exact mind copies and mind transfers are theoretically possible, despite Heisenberg (because information in our crude brains are nowhere near stored at atomic resolution).
Most of these guesses I have put forth explicitly, but now you have a list

Originally Posted by Nikitta

It seems a bit odd - especially since I don't feel like a cluster in my mind. Do you, by this, mean that who a person is is comparable to a culture with different people and elements, which are connected to each other?

I suppose you don't feel yourself splitting 1.000.000.000.000.000.000 times a second? Is this a valid argument against MWI?

Anyhow, I don't mean what you propose. I mean there is not one, single configuration of atoms that corresponds to your identity. This should be a given (since we exchange all our atoms about once every 7 years or so), but most people seem not to think about it. That means 'Nikitta' is not one thing. It's a gigantic collection of things, namely all those configurations corresponding to, say, you at 1-second intervals from your conception till now, most of whom probably self-identify as Nikitta.

Add all your copies if MWI is true, you get a truly astounding number of possible minds which are you. This collection of yous is part of what I call a cluster.

Then consider a multi-multi-multi-dimensional space of all atomic configurations of your brain that corresponds to your past selves. This is not even close to describing the full collection of possible yous, since we could always move 1, 2, 3, 4, ..., 1e15 atoms and still get someone who'd self-identify as you. These copies haven't been realized/instantiated but they nevertheless exist in Platonic or possible forms of 'you'.

Then add all the theoretical non-human brain collections of possible minds which would correspond to your exact inner feelings this instant, including all memories of your past life. THIS is the cluster that corresponds to 'Nikitta'. My conclusion is that 'you' are not a point entity. 'You' are a collection of things, a vast collection of mostly uninstantiated minds which would self-identify as 'Nikitta', many of which (in numbers if not percentagewise) with the exact same memories of your past life as the you reading this has.

Add Boltzmann brains into the fray and the mind dizzies.

Originally Posted by Nikitta

I'm not saying that my musical taste is a basic entry in the universe. I just used it as an example to illustrate that if we woke up profoundly different from who we were when we went to sleep, our surroundings would notice as we don't only have our own memories to form our identity - we also have the memories of those knowing us and they have ours.

Your notion and the universe's notion of "profoundly different" are not the same.
Your example is poor, because musical taste is extremely complex in terms of atomic interactions. What seems like a trivial thing to you is decidedly not so in universal terms. Maybe that's why you think that an astoundingly complex thing like 'self' is basic to the universe?

Originally Posted by Nikitta

I do not think that I have ignored those points, but I think I have dealt with them more specifically in this post.

1) Atoms change during sleep, yes, and we're not conscious (except for of our dreams while we dream, but that's different), but a) I don't think that there is a 1:1 relation to who we are and the atoms in our brains and b) If we changed profoundly during our sleep, our susrroundings would notice.

Our use of "profoundly" is not the same. You are talking about functioning in the human world of social interactions, I am talking about atomic rearrangements.

Originally Posted by Nikitta

2) Yes, we can change immensely and still be us. This is one of the reasons why I think of something which makes each of who we are amd which doesn't change because how else could it be possible to change immensely and still be out selves?

Because of memories? I think your explanation is basically an appeal to ignorance, much like 'explaining' electrical disturbances with ghosts. You have no theoretical basis, no clear definition, no unambiguous observational data etc. etc. I think memories much better than the magical immutable self explains our personal continuity. Plus, I'd venture that I for instance have changed a whole lot over my life. I doubt I'd like myself of 15 or 10 years ago very much. What happens to the magical self here?

Further, I think you implicitly contradict yourself. You fear that copying a mind to another substrate will change it too much to still be us, but you concede we change immensely and still call ourselves 'us'. So does the self reside in some non-physical part of the brain that cannot be copied, or what do you envision?

Originally Posted by Nikitta

3) I agree that our memories ties our actions together. However, I do not think that this has much, if any, bearing on what makes us who we are.


If we were to make a copy of me - her memories would be false.

Define "false"?
It seems you assume what you set out to prove?

Originally Posted by Nikitta

However, neither she nor I would have any way of knowing who of us has the false memory and who has the real one.

So how does nature know which memory is false and which is correct? Does your concept correspond to anything in the real world?

Originally Posted by Nikitta

If mind-copying was possible today, I wouldn't know if I was a copy and my world was created last Thursday - meaning that I came into being last Thursday. There's your connection.

Okay. Is this your basis for dismissing the argument?

Originally Posted by Nikitta

I agree that our memories and the memories of those around us is the only things we have, which connects us to the past. Along with various traces in our live - notes we have taken, things we own and such, but understanding those is based on memory too.

Good. So you don't dismiss the argument after all, or?

[OhMan]

Sorry folks but I'll have to put this thread back on track, I have received my next bombardment of Christian pseudo-argumentation, and require some more assistance. I'll start off with this:

The Jesus of Nazareth yet born in Bethlehem confusion.
I know there is much confusion surrounding this and there have been several attempts from Christians in an attempt to clear it up, but I would like to know what the current deal is.

I am attempting to claim this as one of the big factors showing how Jesus was just a regular man and the Jews tried to shoehorn him into their prophecy at the time, but I am not 100% sure on the details.

Thanks in advance,
OhMan.

[Nikitta]

I apologize for taking such a long time to respond. I thought I'd get around to looking at lesswrong, but didn't much.

I'll bite your post into two halves to avoid it getting too long and haing too much going on in one post, so what I don't respond to in this will follow and don't worry - I won't take a whole month this time

Originally Posted by Torben

Good! We're approaching each other here. The multitudinous Nikittas that you recall were all different, yet they all claimed to be Nikitta. So, no, definitely not at 1:1 relation.

You never said which of these Nikittas should we believe to be the 'real' Nikitta? You say you/they all are. A bit like saying the trinity is one person :P

I don't agree that we're talking about a multitude of different Nikittas - just one, changing over time. I suppose that's the crux of our disagreement.

Originally Posted by Torben

I only conceded the point in the case where alterations would be made to exclude dependence on touch. How about if my smoking desires were edited out? Would it still be me?

Hm - if you were to decide to quit smoking and kick the habit, yourself - you'd still be you and if you'd get someone to hypnotize you to kick the habit, I suppose you'd still be you, but if someone were to physically go into your brains and change whatever it is that causes you to want to smoke? If that's all they did, then logically you'd have to still be you, though there is a reason why there's different between brainwashing someone and merely convincing them that you're right, right?

Maybe the major different between you kicking the habit, yourself, and someone eiditing it out of you would be your sense of continuity. I mean - with the first, it would be a process of gradual change where you'd be aware along the way, but with the other you'd just wake up with your urge to smoke being gone.

Originally Posted by Torben

Agreed, those are major changes. But they are not central to our sense of self, much like a quadruple-amputee would not claim to be a completely different person. You, again, implicitly assume natural changes as occurs during sleep as non-existent because you don't notice them.

No - I don't count them as non-existant. I merely consider them too small to count, since they're not big enough to change you in a way that your surroundings would notice. Also - I don't think that I'm making an appeal to nature. My argument isn't that because something is natural it's good.

Originally Posted by Torben

I don't think you address my point. Yes, memories are important in a colloquial sense, but we're talking about the basis of personal self-identification. You don't address that. You also don't speculate as to what may be the building blocks of your 'self' (trying hard not to call it a soul :P).

Souls tend to be considered immortal and capable of existing independtly of the flesh and I'm not arguing for that, if that makes it easier not to call my notion of a self a soul

Either way, if I haven't addressed your point, then I must've misunderstood it. I was talking about memory as important in our identity.

Originally Posted by Torben

Define 'bigger change'. I pointed to two different views of change; one of matter (hardware) and one of personal identities. I expect us to agree on the first, but you have provided little argument as to the second. You have yet to address the magnitude of change during sleep, dismissing it as normal.

Your notion and the universe's notion of "profoundly different" are not the same.
Your example is poor, because musical taste is extremely complex in terms of atomic interactions. What seems like a trivial thing to you is decidedly not so in universal terms. Maybe that's why you think that an astoundingly complex thing like 'self' is basic to the universe?

Our use of "profoundly" is not the same. You are talking about functioning in the human world of social interactions, I am talking about atomic rearrangements.

I'm lumping these together as they address the same point and yes - it does seem that we use the word "profoundly" in different ways. I do not see the relevance of discussing atomic rearrangements, as we have agreed that there is not a 1 to one relation between how the atoms in our brains are arranged and who we are which is what we're discussing. When it comes to who we are, functioning in the human world of social interactions is what's profound and essential.