Conversion: a how-to-guide please?

[Nikitta]

Part II. I think this picks up what I didn't in part I.

Originally Posted by Torben

I like lesswrong.com, especially their sequences. It's kinda hard to pinpoint good posts there, because so much depends on preceding stuff, but start out with the core sequences and see it it's anything for you. Within the quantum mechanic sequence, there's a lot of stuff related to our topic, especially here, here, here and here.
The latter two are about a fictional 2D species splitting along the 3rd dimension at regular intervals. This may seem silly, but the author believes that the Many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct. Under this notion, we are split gazillions of times each second. Under this notion, many philosophical speculations about personal identity are wrong.

Thanks for your suggestions, but I think I'll make a different thread where I ask for a book on the subject. I think that would help me more.

Originally Posted by Torben

I think there is no sharp boundary between what is 'us' and what is not.
I think minds/personal identitites are not point-like entities (i.e. a mind is not a singular thing, eternal, immutable or ontologically basic).
I think personal identities for us are collections of closely-related minds connected by memory.
I think MWI is the least wrong interpretation of QM and that we therefore split multitudes of times each second.
I think our personalities and entire conscious experiences are programs run on brain hardware.
I think for the above reasons that arbitrarily-close-to-exact mind copies and mind transfers are theoretically possible, despite Heisenberg (because information in our crude brains are nowhere near stored at atomic resolution).
Most of these guesses I have put forth explicitly, but now you have a list

Thank you. In regards to your claim that there is not sharp boundary between what is "us" and what isn't, I assume that you only mean your past, present and future selves - not that there isn't a sharp boundary between for instance what is you and what is me, right?

Originally Posted by Torben

I suppose you don't feel yourself splitting 1.000.000.000.000.000.000 times a second? Is this a valid argument against MWI?

It wasn't an argument; just a reaction

Originally Posted by Torben

Anyhow, I don't mean what you propose. I mean there is not one, single configuration of atoms that corresponds to your identity. This should be a given (since we exchange all our atoms about once every 7 years or so), but most people seem not to think about it. That means 'Nikitta' is not one thing. It's a gigantic collection of things, namely all those configurations corresponding to, say, you at 1-second intervals from your conception till now, most of whom probably self-identify as Nikitta.

Add all your copies if MWI is true, you get a truly astounding number of possible minds which are you. This collection of yous is part of what I call a cluster.

Then consider a multi-multi-multi-dimensional space of all atomic configurations of your brain that corresponds to your past selves. This is not even close to describing the full collection of possible yous, since we could always move 1, 2, 3, 4, ..., 1e15 atoms and still get someone who'd self-identify as you. These copies haven't been realized/instantiated but they nevertheless exist in Platonic or possible forms of 'you'.

Then add all the theoretical non-human brain collections of possible minds which would correspond to your exact inner feelings this instant, including all memories of your past life. THIS is the cluster that corresponds to 'Nikitta'. My conclusion is that 'you' are not a point entity. 'You' are a collection of things, a vast collection of mostly uninstantiated minds which would self-identify as 'Nikitta', many of which (in numbers if not percentagewise) with the exact same memories of your past life as the you reading this has.

Add Boltzmann brains into the fray and the mind dizzies.

My mind dizzied before you added the Boltzman brains.

Originally Posted by Torben

Because of memories? I think your explanation is basically an appeal to ignorance, much like 'explaining' electrical disturbances with ghosts. You have no theoretical basis, no clear definition, no unambiguous observational data etc. etc. I think memories much better than the magical immutable self explains our personal continuity. Plus, I'd venture that I for instance have changed a whole lot over my life. I doubt I'd like myself of 15 or 10 years ago very much. What happens to the magical self here?

I think that the person you were 15 years ago was also you. My point is that there obviously is something which remains the same. I don't know what that is, but I'm not making my argument from not knowing what it is - just from there being something making you still you and I can't see how memories alone could do that, though I'll concede that they play a role.

Originally Posted by Torben

Further, I think you implicitly contradict yourself. You fear that copying a mind to another substrate will change it too much to still be us, but you concede we change immensely and still call ourselves 'us'. So does the self reside in some non-physical part of the brain that cannot be copied, or what do you envision?

What I mean is that something is essential to who we are, but some things are not. Let me explain by a seemingly weird analogy, as we're learning about systematically categorising books and here we're have the following categories: the work, which is the idea the author had; the representation, which is what form it takes (like is it a poem or a novel, what language is it in...etc...); document (printed on paper, how many pages...etc...) and the single copy. Now - you can change something on one of the "lower" level without it necessarily affecting the higher ones. Like - you can change the language in a translation while the story is still the same. Much in the same way, you can change some things in a person while their selves are still the same. If you, however, change something in the work, it would all change.

Does that make sense?

Originally Posted by Torben

Define "false"?
It seems you assume what you set out to prove?

So how does nature know which memory is false and which is correct? Does your concept correspond to anything in the real world?

Yes. The difference is that I'll have experienced the things, which I remember, while my copy will have not - she will merely have a memory of it, without having ever been where I have been.

If I had a memory of having been to Mars, it would be a false memory because I've never actually been to Mars even if I was convinced and even if I somehow managed to convince everyone else - that still wouldn't make it true.

There. I think that I have addressed it all now