The compatibility of objective morality and a creator god

[Xaignar]

This debate will cover the question of whenever or not a creator god is compatible with objective morality. Compatibility is meant in the sense that the existence that one does not require the non-existence of the other. I will be taking the position that they are not compatible, and Ajita Krishna Dasa (henceforth Ajita) will be taking the position that they are compatible.

Per mutual agreement, the debate will take place in accordance with the rules specified in the FAQ, with each post being limited to 10.000 characters. This debate came about in response to the thread "The creator god vs. objectivity"[1], where I put forth roughly the same argument.

The question at hand is by no means new and relates to the Euthyphro dilemma put forward by Plato in his dialog 'Euthyphro'. The Euthyphro dilemma can be states as "Is what is moral commanded by God because it is moral, or is it moral because it's commanded by God?"[2]. More specifically, the question as related to objective morality, and the position that I'm taking, stems from the 'Transcendental Argument from the Non-existence of God'[3] put forward by philosopher Michael Martin in response to the 'Transcendental Argument for the existence of God'[4].

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In order to address the question at hand, it is necessary to properly define the terms used. The first term is 'creator god', which I take to mean a god upon whom everything is contingent. In order to distinguish such a being from mere mechanical forces, I take it to mean that everything must be contingent upon the will of said god.

The second term that requires definition is 'objective morality'. I will take the position that objective morality entails that the truth-value of a moral claim depends (only) upon the object of inquiry, not the subject doing the inquiry. Or, to rephrase, that morality is independent of opinion, hope, expectation, etc. This is contrasted with, among other things, moral subjectivism and moral conventionalism, which holds that moral claims obtain depending on the subject itself, or the conventions of the society associated with the subject.

Finally, I take a moral system to be simply a collection of moral claims that do not, when taken as a whole, lead to contradictions. In the case of an objective moral system, all moral claims within that system must be objective. I will make no other assumptions as to the actual contents of such a system.

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Returning to the issue at hand, I wish to raise 3 major and 1 minor objection to the claim that a creator god could be the source of an objective morality.

The first objection that I wish to raise is as follows: From the above definition of objective morality, we note that the truth-value of a claim must be dependent upon the object of inquiry, not the subject. However, fundamentally, this cannot be the case if divine creation (that is to say, creation by a creator god) obtains, given that this requires that the truth-value of a moral claim must be fundamentally independent of the object of inquiry.

But, if the truth-value of a moral claim is fundamentally independent of the object of inquiry, then it is impossible to come to an objective conclusion regarding a moral claim. Any attempts at finding the objective truth of a moral claim will fail, at best resulting in a subjective answer. Thus, given this fundamental disconnect, it is clear that a creator god cannot provide an objective moral system through objective inquiry.

The second objection that I wish to raise is that it is also the case that no objective justification external to an object can be given, since any choice must be arbitrary and fundamentally subjective. This stems from the requirements of divine creation, namely that everything must be contingent upon the will of the creator god, therefore there can be no pre-existing principles upon which to ground a choice. Thus, even if a justification is given for a choice of moral values, it must ultimately be reducible to arbitrary, and subjective, choices made by the creator god.

Thirdly, one might argue that the creator god can create objective morality by fiat, regardless of the lack of an objective foundation. However, even here we face a problem. The notion that a creator god can create objective morality by fiat is in itself a moral principle. However this cannot then be justified without either refuting divine creation (if we for instance presuppose a pre-existing moral principle), or by making a circular argument. Therefore, we must conclude that a creator god cannot provide an objective morality by fiat.

And finally, a point which does not directly establish that the existence of a creator god presupposes the non-existence of objective morality, but which I consider it relevant none the less: Even if we accept the possibility that a creator god might be the source of a objective moral system, it still follows that there can be no justification for expecting such a moral system, indeed any moral system from a creator god, given that the choice of whenever or not to create such a system would be based upon a foundation of equally arbitrary choices.

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Thus in conclusion, I find that we have three major reasons for supposing that a creator god presupposes the non-existence of objective morality, and that for divine creation to be possible, morality would have to be fundamentally subjective.

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Sources:
[1] http://debate.atheist.net/showthread.php?t=123
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_Dilemma
[3] http://www.infidels.org/library/mode...rame/tang.html
[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transce...istence_of_God